philip gordon is a former american politician and expert in foreign issues and worked as an assistant to president barack obama, and coordinator for the middle east, north africa, and the gulf region from 2013 to 2015.
gordon was the senior white house official for the middle eastern affairs and consulted on several issues, including the iranian nuclear program, peace negotiations in the region, the conflict in syria, security in iraq, relations with the gulf states, democratic transitions in north africa, and bilateral relations with israel, jordan, egypt, morocco, tunisia, and lebanon.
gordon headed several inter-agency operations, regularly met foreign leaders, and managed a team of about twenty managers and other national security professionals. gordon is the author of ‘losing the long game’, his controversial new book, in which he revealed that the united states, since the end of world war ii, has begun to overthrow governments, especially in the middle east, at a rate of one every decade.
the reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the united states pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation.
what is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.
‘losing the long game’ book gives a comprehensive and interesting look at the us experience with regime change over the past seventy years, through the viewpoints of us policymakers in the region, and at the highest levels, telling the story of repeated us interventions in the region, which always began with great hopes and often surrounded by the best of intentions, ending in disasters that almost did not please anyone.
gordon says that future discussion of us policy in the middle east will not be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with america’s standing in the world.
gordon’s narration was distinguished by persuasion and by the way in which american goodwill has skewed predictably, especially in our own countries, and demonstrates, with clear and frank insight the magical thinking that has led american policymakers to often assume so much about the forces of transformation in the middle east, and very little about the limits of the american agencies.
gordon also presented convincing pragmatic arguments that are not characterized by any arrogance, and the need for the american administration to increase reliance on diplomacy in making changes instead of getting involved in unfavorable military interventions, with the need for the us administration to realize that disturbing regimes in the region do not mean the need to change them.
gordon also says that american politicians, after seventy years do not know enough about the middle east, and here he wonders how many times washington needs to fail before it finally knows enough.
although gordon’s comprehensive book contained little information, it was characterized by frankness and bitter criticism of the history of the coup orchestrated by the cia to overthrow president mohammad mossadegh in iran in 1953, and other attempts, all the way to all the failed efforts to topple the regime of president bashar al-assad.
gordon’s book is worth reading and it confirms that there are no hidden powers and secret governments ruling the world. the largest, most powerful, and the brutal government is vulnerable to a terrible failure.